Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground I by Johannes Korbmacher
J Philos Logic
DOI 10.1007/s10992-016-9423-9
Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground I
The Base Theory
Johannes Korbmacher1
Received: 24 June 2016 / Accepted: 22 December 2016
© The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This is part one of a two-part paper, in which we develop an axiomatic
theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use
of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. This allows
us to connect theories of partial ground with axiomatic theories of truth. In this part
of the paper, we develop an axiomatization of the relation of partial ground over the
truths of arithmetic and show that the theory is a proof-theoretically conservative
extension of the theory PT of positive truth. We construct models for the theory and
draw some conclusions for the semantics of conceptualist ground.
Keywords Metaphysical grounding · Axiomatic theories of truth · Predicational
theories of ground · Positive truth
1 Introduction
Partial ground is the relation of one truth holding either wholly or partially in virtue
of another [13, 15].1 To illustrate the concept, consider a couple of paradigmatic
examples:
1For (opinionated) introductions to the concept(s) of ground, see [7, 13]. For an overview of the recent
literature, see [2, 4, 24, 29]. Most research focuses on the notion of full ground: the relation of one thing
holding wholly in virtue of a possibly plurality of other truths [13, p. 37]. For reasons that we will discuss
more comprehensively in Section 5, we will focus on the notion of partial ground in this paper. For more
on the distinction between full and partial ground, see [13, p. 50].
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(1) The truth of the disjunction that 5 + 7 = 12 or 1 = 2 holds wholly in virtue of
the truth of its only true disjunct that 5 + 7 = 12.
(2) The truth of the conjunction that 5 + 7 = 12 and 2 × 2 = 4 holds partially in
virtue of the truth of its first conjunct that 5 + 7 = 12 and partially in virtue of
the truth of its other conjunct that 2 × 2 = 4.
Partial ground in this sense is a strict partial order on the truths: it is irreflexive—
no truth partially grounds itself—and it is transitive—partial grounds are inherited
through partial grounding.2 Thus, partial ground gives rise to a hierarchy of grounds,
in which the partial grounds of a truth rank “strictly below” the truth itself. The aim
of this paper is to axiomatize this hierarchy over the truths of arithmetic.3
The main novelty of the paper is that we will use a ground predicate rather than an
operator to formalize partial ground. This approach to formalizing partial ground has
several philosophical benefits, which we will outline in more detail in the following
section. So far, however, most authors have eschewed the approach for reasons we’ll
discuss in detail in the following section as well. Ultimately, we argue, the benefits
of the approach outweigh it’s perceived drawbacks. Most importantly, the predicate
approach will allow us to connect theories of partial ground with axiomatic theories
of truth. In particular, once we’ve formulated the usually accepted principles of partial
ground using a ground predicate, we can bring out the truth-theoretic commitments
of theories of partial ground, in the sense that we can show that the resulting theory
of partial ground is a conservative extension of the well-known theory PT of positive
truth [16, p. 116–22].
2 The Predicate Treatment of Partial Ground
In this paper, we will formalize partial ground using the relational predicate  of
sentences—our ground predicate. We’ll add this predicate to the language of PA,
where we may obtain a unique name ϕ for every sentence ϕ using the technique of
Go¨del-numbering. Here and in the following, we shall take the relata of partial ground
to be (true) sentences, the idea being that partial ground is a relation on the truths
2This is, in any case, the standard view of partial ground. Some authors have challenged this view: Jenkins
[17] challenges the claim that partial ground is irreflexive and Schaffer [27] challenges the claim that
partial ground is transitive. See Litland [21] and Raven [25] for a defense of the standard view against
these challenges.
3The main reason for taking arithmetic as the starting point here is that the standard theory of arithmetic,
Peano arithmetic PA, can double in well-known ways as a theory of arithmetic and a theory of syntax
(see Section 3). Thus, by taking PA as our starting point, we can effectively kill two birds with one stone:
PA can function as the theory that tells us which sentences are true and function as a theory of syntax that
allows us to talk about these sentences. Regardless of this technical convenience, nothing philosophically
“deep” hinges on this particular theory choice. Note, however, that we’re explicitly not including truths
about partial ground in the hierarchy. There are specific technical and philosophical issues that arise in the
context of such truths, which shall be discussed in the second part of the paper. See also our discussion of
the issue on p. 11 of this article.
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(for further discussion of this assumption, see p. 6 below). Thus, we can formalize
example (1) from above by:
5 + 7 = 12  5 + 7 = 12 ∨ 1 = 2,
where n is the numeral for the natural number n. In contrast, most authors formalize
partial ground using the operator ≺ of sentences—the (partial) ground operator.4 In
the case of our example, these authors would add the ground operator to the language
of PA, and then formalize example (1) by:
5 + 7 = 12 ≺ (5 + 7 = 12 ∨ 1 = 2).
The syntactic difference between the two approaches is that the ground predi-
cate takes terms denoting sentences as arguments, while the ground operator takes
sentences themselves as arguments.
The predicational theory of partial ground that we will develop in this paper sub-
sumes the standard operational theory of partial ground, in the sense that for all
sentences ϕ and ψ , if ϕ ≺ ψ is derivable in the latter theory, then ϕψ is deriv-
able in our theory. The converse direction, however, does not hold in general: there
are sentences ϕ and ψ such that ϕ  ψ is derivable in our theory, while ϕ ≺ ψ
is not derivable in the standard theory of partial ground.5 Thus, on the predicate
approach we are able to obtain a strictly stronger theory of partial ground.
But there are other reasons to prefer the predicate approach over the operator
approach:
2.1 Quantification over Truths
The predicate approach has greater expressive strength than the operator approach. In
particular, using the ground predicate, we can formalize ground-theoretic principles
involving quantification over truths in a natural way. Take the two principles stating
that partial ground is an irreflexive and transitive relation on the truths as an example.
On the predicate approach, we can directly formalize these principles as:
(Irreflexivity) : ∀x¬(x  x)
(Transitivity) : ∀x∀y∀z(x  y ∧ y  z → x  z)
where the intended range of the quantifiers is the set of all truths.6 On the oper-
ator approach, in contrast, we can (prima facie) only formalize these principles
4Cf. [5, 13–15, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28]. Different authors may use different symbols for the ground operator.
5We will show this rigorously in Section 4.2.
6In the literature on ground, we distinguish between factive and non-factive conceptions of ground (cf.
[13, p. 48–50]). On a factive conception, ground can only obtain between factive things, such as truths or
facts. On a non-factive conception, the relation of ground can also hold between non-factive things, such
as falsehoods or non-obtaining states of affairs. The notion of partial ground that we are working with in
this paper is a factive notion of ground. Later we shall enforce this by means of axioms stipulating that the
relation of partial ground can only hold between truths.
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by affirming the instances of the following schemata for all sentences ϕ,ψ ,
and θ :
(Irreflexivity≺) : ¬(ϕ ≺ ϕ)
(Transitivity≺) : (ϕ ≺ ψ) ∧ (ψ ≺ θ) → (ϕ ≺ θ)
Thus, on the operator approach, we can achieve quantification over truths only by
moving to quantification over sentences in the meta-language, while on the predicate
approach, we can directly express quantification over truths in the object language.7
Moreover, the strategy of moving to quantification in the meta-language fails once
we consider principles involving existential quantifiers. Think for example of the
intuitively plausible principle that a sentence is true iff its truth is either fundamental
or grounded in some other truth. On the predicate approach, we can straightforwardly
formalize this principle as:
∀x(T r(x) ↔ (Fund(x) ∨ ∃y(y  x))),
where T r is a unary truth predicate that applies to all and only the true sentences and
Fund is a unary predicate that applies to all and only the sentences whose truth is fun-
damental. Moreover, we could plausibly define this predicate Fund by postulating
that:
∀x(Fund(x) ↔def T r(x) ∧ ¬∃y(y  x)).
Then, in a predicational theory of ground with this definition, we’ll be able to derive
the claim that a sentence is true iff its truth is either fundamental or grounded in some
other truth. On the operator approach, in contrast, we could not even formalize the
principle in the first place: there simply is no way to express the nested universal and
existential quantification over truths on that approach.
Finally, using quantification over truths, we can define useful ground-theoretic
concepts directly in our object language. Take the concept of weak partial ground as
an example [13, p. 51–53]. This is the relation of one truth being a “stand-in” for
another in the context of partial ground. Following [13, p. 52], we can define weak
partial ground in terms of our ordinary, strict notion of partial ground by saying that
the truth of ϕ weakly partially grounds the truth ofψ just in case the truth of ϕ strictly
partially grounds any truth that the truth of ψ grounds. It then follows, for example,
that any truth weakly partially grounds itself, since clearly it strictly partially grounds
any truth that it itself strictly partially grounds. Or, for another example, if the truth
of ϕ strictly partially grounds the truth of ψ , then the truth of ϕ also weakly partially
grounds the truth of ψ . This follows immediately from the transitivity of (ordinary
strict) partial ground.8 But conversely, it may very well happen that the truth of ϕ
7A remark is in order: We could, of course, achieve similar results on the operator approach using quan-
tification into sentence position or propositional quantification. But propositional quantification means a
significant deviation from classical logic, while on the present approach we can comfortably stay within
the purview of classical (first-order) logic. This highlights another benefit of the predicate approach: it
allows us to study partial ground using entirely standard methods, well-known from first-order logic and
model-theory.
8To see this, suppose that the truth of ϕ strictly partially grounds the truth of ψ and that the truth of ψ
strictly partially grounds the truth of some arbitrary θ . It follows immediately by the transitivity of strict
partial ground that the truth of ϕ strictly partially grounds the truth of θ , establishing that the truth of ϕ
weakly partially grounds the truth of ψ .
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weakly partially grounds the truth of some ψ without strictly grounding it. Just think
of the case where ψ is identical to ϕ: we’ve just seen that the truth of ϕ weakly
grounds itself, but by the irreflexivity of strict partial ground (see p. 2) ϕ does not
strictly partially ground itself.9
On the predicate approach, we can define a binary predicate  for this relation by
postulating:
∀x∀y(x  y ↔def ∀z(y  z → x  z)).
On the operator approach, in contrast, we can’t define weak partial ground in this
way—there we need to introduce a primitive operator 	 for the relation together with
the semantic postulate that for all sentences ϕ and ψ :
ϕ 	 ψ is true iff for all θ, if ψ ≺ θ is true, then ϕ ≺ θ is true.
Thus, on the operator approach, we need to introduce additional syntax and addi-
tional semantics to deal with weak partial ground, while on the predicate approach
we can use standard first-order definitions in the object language.
2.2 Truth and Partial Ground
A major benefit of the predicate approach is that it allows us to study the connections
between partial ground and truth in a natural setting. It should be clear that partial
ground is conceptually related to truth—partial ground is a relation on the truths after
all. In axiomatic theories of truth, the concept is standardly formalized by means of a
unary predicate of sentences [16]. By formalizing partial ground analogously using a
relational predicate, we create a ground-theoretic framework in which we can fruit-
fully study the connections between truth and partial ground. For example, we will
show in this paper that if we formulate the usually accepted principles for partial
ground using a ground predicate, the resulting theory turns out to be a conservative
extension of the well-known theory of positive truth [16, p. 116–22]. In other words,
the predicate approach allows us to make the truth-theoretic commitments of theories
of ground explicit. In the second part of this paper, we shall investigate the connec-
tions between partial ground and truth further. There we shall show, for example, that
we can formulate a typed solution to Fine’s puzzle of ground [14] in our axiomatic
framework.
2.3 Semantics of Partial Ground
Finally, the ground predicate allows us to use classic model-theoretic methods to
study the semantics of partial ground. In the literature on ground, we usually dis-
tinguish between conceptualist and factualist notions of ground [5, p. 256–59],
[7, p. 14f]. On a conceptualist notion, ground is a relation on fine-grained, conceptu-
ally individuated truths. For example, on a conceptualist notion, we would typically
say that if ϕ is a true sentence, then the truth of ϕ ∨ ϕ holds in virtue of the truth of
ϕ, but not the other way around. On a factualist conception, in contrast, ground is a
9For a (critical) discussion of the concept of weak ground, see [11].
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relation on coarse-grained, worldly individuated facts. On this conception, we would
typically deny that if ϕ is a true sentence, the fact that ϕ ∨ ϕ holds in virtue of the
fact that ϕ, since the two facts are the same—albeit expressed differently. The notion
of partial ground that we are interested in here is a conceptualist notion of ground.
It is currently an open problem to provide a formal semantics for a conceptualist
notion of ground.10 On the operator approach, it is difficult to define such a seman-
tics, since we have to start “from scratch,” as it were: we have to find the right kind
of structure to interpret conceptualist ground and provide primitive semantic clauses
for the ground operator. On the predicate approach, in contrast, if we can develop a
consistent first-order axiomatization of conceptualist ground, we can infer the exis-
tence of a (first-order) model by the completeness theorem for first-order logic. Once
we know that such a model exists, we can study it using methods of classic model
theory. This should then help us determine the right kind of structure and the correct
semantic clauses to interpret conceptualist ground operators, as well.
In the rest of the paper, we will develop an axiomatization of partial ground over
the truths of arithmetic, which fulfills the promises from the previous list of benefits.
But before we begin, we shall briefly address an argument that is sometimes brought
forward against the predicate approach: Correia [5, p. 254] and Fine [13, p. 46–
47] argue that we should prefer the operator approach for reasons of ontological
neutrality. They argue that since on the predicate approach we have terms denoting
the relata of ground, by Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, the approach
commits us to the existence of the relata of ground. Moreover, they argue that since on
the predicate approach we are committed to the existence of the relata of ground, we
need a background theory for them. On the operator approach, in contrast, they argue
we don’t have any of that: we only need to have the (true) sentences that the ground
operator acts upon. This argument is particularly forceful on a factualist conception
of partial ground, where we take the relata of ground to be facts. As Correia then puts
it: “it should be possible to make claims of grounding and fail to believe in facts”
[5, p. 254].
In this paper, however, we work on a conceptualist notion of partial ground, where
we take the relata of ground to be truths.11 Moreover, these truths are truths of sen-
tences. Correspondingly, we formalize partial ground using a relational predicate
of (true) sentences. Thus, by Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, we are
only committed to the existence of (true) sentences. Our background theory is corre-
spondingly simply a standard theory of syntax. These ontological commitments are
metaphysically innocuous: ontologically speaking, sentences are relatively harmless
10There are semantics for factualist notions of ground in the literature. The most commonly discussed
semantics for the ground operator is given by Fine [13, p. 71–74] and Fine [15, p. 7–10] in terms of
truthmakers. A related algebraic semantics is given by Correia [5, p. 274–76]. But as Fine [13, Fn 22,
p. 74] himself notes, these semantics are not sound for a conceptualist notion of ground.
11For the distinction between truths and facts, see [12]. Note that according to Fine truths are not (true)
sentences, rather they are derived entities that get their identity criteria from (true) sentences: truths accord-
ing to Fine are a kind of linguistically individuated facts. In this paper, we don’t presuppose a specific
metaphysical understanding of truths: they can be anything from true sentences to metaphysically robust
fact-like entities in their own right.
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entities. Moreover, on the operator approach, we need to assume the existence of
sentences to formulate our theory in the first place. Thus, even though the opera-
tor approach is, strictly speaking, ontologically more parsimonious, the ontological
commitments of our version of the predicate approach are fairly harmless.
3 Technical Preliminaries
To develop our axiomatization of partial ground over the truths of arithmetic, we
need a background theory of arithmetic, which tells us what we need to know about
arithmetic, and a background theory of syntax, which allows us to talk about the
(true) sentences of arithmetic. It is well-known that PA can double as a theory of
arithmetic and as a theory of syntax. This can be achieved using the technique of
Go¨del-numbering. In this section, we will recount the basics of this technique and fix
notation.12
Let L be the language of PA. We assume that L has the standard arithmetic
vocabulary: an individual constant 0 intended to denote the natural number zero, a
unary function symbol S intended to express the successor function on the natu-
ral numbers, and binary function symbols + and × intended to denote addition and
multiplication on the natural numbers respectively. For every natural number n, we
standardly define the numeral n as the n-fold application of S to the constant 0. The
numeral n is, of course, intended to denote the number n. Note that ‘n’ is merely a
meta-linguistic abbreviation of the official object-linguistic term ‘S . . . Sn’. The lan-
guage of truth LT r is the result of extending L with the unary truth predicate T r ,
the language of predicational ground LT r is the result of extending LT r with the
binary ground predicate , and the language of (simple) operational ground L≺ is
the result of extending L with the applications of the binary ground operator ≺ over
L: L≺ := L∪{ϕ ≺ ψ | ϕ,ψ ∈ L}.13 In the following, we will mainly work in within
LT r .
We use the technique of Go¨del-numbering to obtain names for every expression.
In particular, we use a coding function # to injectively map every expression σ to a
natural number #σ—the Go¨del number of the expression. If σ is an expression, then
we also write σ for the numeral intended to denote #σ . This will be our name for
σ . For the most part, we simply assume that we have some coding function for the
language L, but later we will discuss theories that require coding functions for LT r
and even LT r .
The theory PA of PA consists of the standard axioms for zero, the successor
function, addition, and multiplication, plus all the instances of the induction scheme
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(x) → ϕ(Sx)) → ∀xϕ(x)
12We assume that the reader is already familiar with the basics of first-order logic and has at least a rough
understanding of how Go¨del-numbering works. For the details, we refer the reader to [3].
13Note that we’re explicitly excluding iterations of the operator ≺ here. See also our discussion on p. 11
below.
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over formulas ϕ(x) in the language L. We denote derivability in PA by PA (and
analogously for other systems discussed in the paper). However, if what we mean is
clear from the context, we omit the subscript.
It is well-known that PA can represent any recursive function, in the sense that
if f is a recursive function then there is a formula ϕ(x, y) such that for all natural
numbers n,m:
f (n) = m iff PA ∀x(ϕ(n, x) ↔ x = m).
Many syntactic functions on the codes of expressions are recursive and thus repre-
sentable. For example, the function that maps the code #ϕ of a formula ϕ to the code
#¬ϕ of its negation is recursive. It is convenient to assume that L has function sym-
bols for a finite number of those functions. Notation-wise, if f is a recursive function,
then we use f
·
as our function symbol for it. In particular, we assume that we have
function symbols ¬· , ∨· , ∧· , ∃· , ∀· , and =· for the corresponding syntactic operations on
the codes of expressions. If we work in the context of a coding for LT r , we addition-
ally assume a function symbol T r· for the function that maps the code #t of a term t
to the code #T r(t) of the atomic formula T r(t) ∈ LT r . And if we work in the con-
text of a coding for LT r , we assume a function symbol · for the function that maps
the codes #s and #t of two terms to the code #(s  t) of the atomic formula s  t .
We can then conservatively extend our axioms with the defining equations for those
functions such that for all formulas ϕ and ψ , for all variables v, and for all terms t :
PA s =· t = s = t PA ¬· ϕ = ¬ϕ
PA ϕ ∧· ψ = ϕ ∧ ψ PA ϕ ∨· ψ = ϕ ∨ ψ
PA ∃· (v, ϕ) = ∃vϕ PA ∀· (v, ϕ) = ∀vϕ
When we work in the context of coding functions forLT r andLT r , we furthermore
get of all terms s and t that:
PA T r· (t) = T r(t) PA s · t = s  t
Note that, in particular, we get that PA T r· (ϕ) = T r(ϕ), for every sen-
tence ϕ. The ternary substitution function sub such that for all formulas ϕ, terms t ,
and variables v sub(#ϕ, #t, #v) = #ϕ(t/v) provided that t is free for v in ϕ, is recur-
sive and thus representable. Officially, we represent this function by the function
symbol sub· and add its defining equations to our axioms, but unofficially we often
simply write ϕ(t, v) instead of sub· (ϕ, t, v) and if there is only one
free variable in ϕ, we often simply write ϕ(t). The function that maps a natural
number n to the code #n of its numeral n is also recursive and we will use the function
symbol ˙ for this in our language. Note that, in particular, we get for all sentences
ϕ that PA ˙ϕ = ϕ. We write ϕ(x˙) as an abbreviation for sub· (ϕ, x˙).
This allows us to quantify over free variables in the context of names. The valua-
tion function val that applied to (the code of) a closed term yields its denotation is
also recursive and thus representable. Officially, however, we cannot have a function
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symbol representing the valuation function, since otherwise we run the risk of incon-
sistency [16, p. 32]. We will nevertheless write s◦ = t to say that the denotation of s
is t , as if ◦ was a function symbol representing the valuation function. Officially, this
is merely an abbreviation for the corresponding complex defining formula.
PA can also (strongly) represent every recursive set, in the sense that if S is a
recursive set then there is a formula ϕ(x) such that for all natural numbers n:
n ∈ S iff PA ϕ(n) and n ∈ S iff PA ¬ϕ(n)
In the following, we’ll write Sent to abbreviate the formula that allows us to rep-
resent the recursive set of codes sentences in L, SentT r for the formula that allows us
to represent the codes of sentences in LT r , and SentT r for the formula that allows us
to represent the codes of sentences in LT r . Similarly, V ar and ClT erm are abbrevi-
ations for the formulas that allow us to represent the sets of (codes of) variables and
closed terms. As an abbreviation for ∀x(V ar(x) → ϕ(x))we write ∀vϕ(v) and as an
abbreviation for ∀x(ClT erm(x) → ϕ(x)) we write ∀tϕ(t). We also sometimes use
the notation ∀tT r(ϕ(t·)) for ∀x(ClT erm(x) → T r(sub· (ϕ, x))). This allows us
to quantify over terms in the context of names.
We assume that PA has the defining axioms for all of these function symbols and
predicates as axioms. Furthermore, the theory PAT extends PA with the missing
instances of the induction scheme over LT r and the theory PAG extends PAT with
all the missing instances of the induction scheme over LT r .
Finally, we will exclusively work in the context of the standard model of PA. This
model of L has the set N of the natural numbers as its domain and in it 0 actually
denotes the number zero, S actually denotes the successor function, and + and ×
actually denote addition and multiplication. In other words, we don’t allow for non-
standard interpretations of the arithmetic vocabulary. We denote this model by N. A
model for LT r , then, has the form (N, S), where N is the standard model and S ⊆ N
interprets the truth predicate T r . A model for LT r has the form (N, S, R), where
(N, S) is a model of LT r and R ⊆ N2 interprets our ground predicate . Thus, on
our notion of a model, the interpretation of the arithmetic vocabulary is fixed, but we
are allowed to freely interpret the truth predicate and the ground predicate.14 Note
that we don’t have a notion of a model of L≺, since finding appropriate models for
this language is an open problem.
4 Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground
4.1 Axioms for Partial Ground
We begin from the standardly accepted principles for partial ground formulated on
the operator approach. The most comprehensive conceptualist system for ground on
14The notation and background theory we use in this paper is adapted from the standard notation and
background theory used in axiomatic theories of truth. For the reader not familiar with these conventions,
we recommend [16, p. 29–38].
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the operator approach is the pure and impure logic of ground developed by Fine
[13, p. 54–71]. However, Fine’s system deals with various notions of ground and
takes the full notion of ground as fundamental [13, p. 50]—it contains a system
for partial ground only as a subsystem. Moreover, Fine’s system is formulated in a
sequent-style, which makes it difficult to deal with for our present purpose. For these
reasons, we will take the system of Schnieder [28] as our starting point. Schnieder’s
system is not primarily intended as a system for partial ground: it is intended as a
system for the non-causal uses of the binary explanatory connective ‘because’ from
natural language [28, Fn 8, p. 446–47]. However, there are uses of ‘because’ that
coincide with the present sense of partial ground: when we say that one truth holds
either wholly or partially because of another truth, we can interpret this as saying
that the one truth holds either wholly or partially in virtue of the other truth. The
interpretation of ‘because’ is often given in the literature on ground and is sometimes
even used as a paradigmatic natural language example for ground [13, p. 37–38].15
Since Schnieder’s system is supposed to account for all non-causal uses of ‘because’,
it should also cover this non-causal use of because—in other words: we can interpret
Schnieder’s system as a system for partial ground.16
Schnieder formulates his system over pure first-order logic as his base-theory, but
the system can easily be adapted to the present framework. If we take Schnieder’s
system and formulate it in the language L≺ over PA as its base-theory, we arrive at
the following system:
Definition 1 The operational theory of (partial) ground OG consists of the axioms
of PA, all the instances of the axiom scheme:
¬(ϕ ≺ ϕ),
for sentences ϕ ∈ L, plus the following rules of inference for partial ground for all
formulas ϕ,ψ, θ ∈ L:









ϕ ≺ ϕ ∨ ψ
ψ
ψ ≺ ϕ ∨ ψ
ϕ ψ
ϕ ≺ ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ ψ
ψ ≺ ϕ ∧ ψ
¬ϕ
¬ϕ ≺ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
¬ψ
¬ψ ≺ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
¬ϕ ¬ψ
¬ϕ ≺ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
¬ϕ ¬ψ









Note well that the theory OG is formulated in the language L≺, which explicitly
doesn’t allow for iterations of ≺. This is in line with the standard restriction in the
15For a detailed discussion of the relation between ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’, see [2, Section 4].
16In fact, we can show that the fragment of Fine’s system that deals with partial ground coincides with
Schnieder’s system interpreted as a system for partial ground.
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literature to un-iterated or simple instances of ground. Iterated ground raises specific
technical and philosophical issues, which fall outside the scope of this article.17
Schnieder [28, p. 452–53] shows the proof-theoretic conservativity of the propo-
sitional fragment of his system over pure propositional logic. This proof is easily
extended to show the conservativity of his quantified system, which we used as
our starting point, over pure first-order logic.18 However, since we take PA as our
background theory, we give a slightly different proof of the analogous result for the
present context:
Proposition 1 (Schnieder) The system OG is a proof-theoretically conservative
extension of PA.
Proof The complexity function c, which maps the code #ϕ of a formula ϕ to the code
#|ϕ| of its logical complexity |ϕ|, is recursive and thus representable in PA. Let c·
represent this function. Furthermore, let <· represent the recursive strictly-less-than
relation < on the natural numbers. We define the translation function τ : L≺ → L
recursively by saying that:
(i) τ(ϕ) = ϕ, for ϕ an atomic formula;
(ii) τ(¬ϕ) = ¬τ(ϕ);
(iii) τ(ϕ ◦ ψ) = τ(ϕ) ◦ τ(ψ), for ◦ = ∧,∨;
(iv) τ(Qxϕ) = Qx(τ(ϕ)), for Q = ∀, ∃; and
(v) τ(ϕ ≺ ψ) = (ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ c· (ϕ) <· c· (ψ)).
Note that in clause (v), we need not translate ϕ and ψ , since they are, by assumption,
already in L.
It is now easily seen by induction on the complexity of formulas that (a) for all
ϕ ∈ L, τ(ϕ) = ϕ. In words: τ is constant on the arithmetic formulas. Next, we
show that (b) τ preserves theoremhood over the two systems OG and PA, in the
sense that for all ϕ ∈ L≺, if OG ϕ, then PA τ(ϕ). We show (b) by an induction
on the length of derivations. Of course, we only need to consider the rules of OG
that are not rules of PA. If ϕ = ¬(ϕ′ ≺ ϕ′) is an instance of the axiom scheme of
OG, for ϕ′ ∈ L, then we get that τ(ϕ) =(v),(a) ¬(ϕ′ ∧ ϕ′ ∧ c· (ϕ
′) <· c· (ϕ
′)). But
PA ¬(ϕ′ ∧ ϕ′ ∧ c· (ϕ
′) <· c· (ϕ
′)), since PA ∀x¬(x <· x) and thus in particular
PA ¬(c· (ϕ
′) <· c· (ϕ
′)). So assume the induction hypothesis. For the induction step,
we need to go through all the inference rules of OG case by case. Here we only
discuss one case to illustrate the idea. Consider the case where the last step has been
an application of the rule:
ϕ
ϕ ≺ ¬¬ϕ ,
17For a discussion of these issues, see, e.g., [1, 10, 20]. There are particular issues to do with iterated
ground that arise in the context of the predicate approach taken in this article, which will be explicitly
discussed in the second part of the article.
18Schnieder does not carry out the details himself. The proof is left to the interested reader.
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where ϕ ∈ L. First note that since ϕ ∈ L, we get that τ(ϕ) = ϕ by (a) and
furthermore that (∗) PA ϕ by the induction hypothesis. Now consider, τ(ϕ ≺
¬¬ϕ) =(v),(a) ϕ ∧ ¬¬ϕ ∧ c· (ϕ) <· c· (¬· ¬· ϕ). By (∗) we know that PA ϕ and
thus PA ¬¬ϕ by elementary logic. And we know that PA c· (ϕ) <· c· (¬· ¬· ϕ),
since PA ∀x(Sent (x) → c· (x) <· c· (¬· ¬· x)). The other cases are equally straightfor-
ward. Putting the two claims (a) and (b) together, the proposition follows.
Note that the translation function used in the proof is not particularly faithful: we
can derive a lot of intuitively false claims under the translation. For example, it is
intuitively false that 0 = 0 ≺ ¬∃x(Sx = 0), since the (logical) truth of 0 = 0
has nothing to do with the truth of (the axiom) ¬∃x(Sx = 0). Nevertheless, we
will get that PA τ(0 = 0 ≺ ¬∃x(Sx = 0)) with τ defined as in the proof, since
τ(0 = 0 ≺ ¬∃x(Sx = 0)) is equal to
0 = 0 ∧ ¬∃x(Sx = 0) ∧ c· (0 = 0) <· c· (¬∃x(Sx = 0)),
which is provable in PA. But this is not a counterexample to the claim in the proof,
since the operational theory of ground does not prove 0 = 0 ≺ ¬∃x(Sx = 0)
to begin with, and all that is required for our proof is that the translation preserves
theoremhood. The result, then, immediately gives us the proof-theoretic consistency
of the predicational theory of partial ground:
Corollary 1 (Schnieder) The system OG is proof-theoretically consistent.
Note that the proof-theoretic consistency of the operational theory of ground does
not entail that there are models for the theory, since we have not even defined the
notion of a model for its language, much less have we shown that proof-theoretic
consistency in this language implies the existence of models.
We obtain our axiomatization of partial ground over the truths of arithmetic by
translating the axioms and rules of the operational theory into quantified axioms,
which we formulate using the ground predicate. For this purpose, we assume that we
have a Go¨del-numbering for L. Let us begin with the axiom scheme ¬(ϕ ≺ ϕ), for
sentences ϕ ∈ L, which expresses the irreflexivity of partial ground. We straight-
forwardly translate this to the quantified axiom ∀x¬(x  x). To translate the first
rule:
ϕ ≺ ψ ψ ≺ θ
ϕ ≺ θ ,
which captures the transitivity of partial ground, we first transform the rule into the
conditional (ϕ ≺ ψ) ∧ (ψ ≺ θ) → (ϕ ≺ θ), and then translate this conditional into
the quantified axiom ∀x∀y∀z(x  y ∧ y  z → x  z). To translate the remaining
rules, we need to use a “trick” in order to quantify over formulas that are affirmed






which express that partial ground is a relation on the truths. Again, we first translate
the rules into the conditionals (ϕ ≺ ψ) → ϕ and (ϕ ≺ ψ) → ψ . Then, in order to
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quantify over the formulas affirmed in the consequent, we use the truth predicate T r .








 ∀x∀y(x  y → T r(x) ∧ T r(y))
Note that we use the truth predicate T r here simply as a quantificational device: it
allows us to generalize over the truths involved in partial ground outside the context
of partial ground.
By applying the same strategy to the rule involving double negation, we get the
following transformation:
ϕ
ϕ ≺ ¬¬ϕ  ∀x(T r(x) → x  ¬· ¬· x)
But now we face a problem: The operational theory of ground can not only prove
that if ϕ is a true sentence, then the truth of ¬¬ϕ is grounded in the truth of ϕ, but
also that if ¬¬ϕ is a true sentence, then the truth of ¬¬ϕ is grounded in the truth of
ϕ. Formally, we get both OG ϕ → (ϕ ≺ ¬¬ϕ) and OG ¬¬ϕ → (ϕ ≺ ¬¬ϕ).
But the corresponding quantified claim ∀x(T r(¬· ¬· x) → x  ¬· ¬· x) is not derivable
from our axioms so far. In response to this, we might be tempted to simply add the
T-scheme:
T r(ϕ) ↔ ϕ,
for all sentences ϕ ∈ L, to our theory. This would allow us to derive T r(¬¬ϕ) →
ϕ¬¬ϕ for every formula ϕ. But this is not enough. We wish to derive the full
quantified claim ∀x(T r(¬· ¬· x) → x  ¬· ¬· x) in our theory and merely using the T-
scheme this is impossible. Therefore, we will add the quantified claim as an axiom
to our system.
Thus, corresponding to every rule of the operational theory of ground, we have two
axioms: an upward directed axiom, like ∀x(T r(x) → x  ¬· ¬· x), and a downward
directed axiom, like ∀x(T r(¬· ¬· x) → x  ¬· ¬· x). In the cases of the other rules, we
can moreover make some simplifications. To illustrate, consider the case of the rules
involving conjunction. We get the following transformations:
Upward:
ϕ ψ
ϕ ≺ ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ ψ




 ∀x∀y(T r(x)∧T r(y) → xx∧· y ∧ yx∧· y)
Downward:
ϕ∧ψ → (ϕ ≺ ϕ∧ψ)∧(ψ ≺ ϕ∧ψ)  ∀x∀y(T r(x∧· y) → xx∧· y ∧ yx∧· y)
Intuitively, the upward directed axioms say what truths a given truth grounds, while
the downward directed axioms say what truths ground a given truth. And intuitively,
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both kinds of principles are required: we want to say both what grounds a truth and
in what it is grounded.19
Finally, we need to add some axioms to get our hierarchy “off the ground,” as
it were. So far, we have no axiom that allows us to introduce the truth predicate.
Thus, we are not able to prove the antecedent of any of our quantified axioms. To fix
this, we propose to add some basic truth axioms that apply the truth predicate to the
atomic formulas of PA—they allow us to introduce the truth predicate in the case of
true equations. For this purpose, we use the standard idea from axiomatic theories of
truth:20
∀s∀t (T r(s =· t) ↔ s
◦ = t◦)
∀s∀t (T r(s =
·
t) ↔ s◦ = t◦)
In words, an equation is true iff the terms flanking the equality symbol have the
same denotation. These axioms get our axiomatization “off the ground,” in the sense
that we can prove the truth of true equations and then use the other axioms to track
partial ground through the complexity of the truths. Finally, since we wish to talk
about the truths of arithmetic, we want to ensure that the truth predicate only applies
to sentences of L. We achieve this by postulating that:
∀x(T r(x) → Sent (x)).
Note that from this axiom together with the axiom ∀x∀y(x  y → T r(x) ∧ T r(y))
it follows that also the ground predicate only applies to sentences of L:
∀x∀y(x  y → Sent (x) ∧ Sent (y)).
In other words, out theory is a simply typed theory of partial ground.
We arrive at the following axiomatization:
Definition 2 The predicational theory of (partial) ground PG consists of the axioms
of PAG plus the following axioms:
Basic Ground Axioms: Basic Truth Axioms:
G1 ∀x¬(x  x) T1 ∀s∀t (T r(s =· t) ↔ s
◦ = t◦)
G2 ∀x∀y∀z(x  y ∧ y  z → x  z) T2 ∀s∀t (T r(s =· t) ↔ s
◦ = t◦)
G3 ∀x∀y(x  y → T r(x) ∧ T r(y)) T3 ∀x(T r(x) → Sent (x))
Upward Directed Axioms:
U1 ∀x(T r(x) → x  ¬· ¬· x)
U2 ∀x∀y((T r(x) → x  x ∨· y) ∧ (T r(y) → y  x ∨· y))
19A nice feature of our theory is that it proves all the instances of the T-scheme via the upward and
downward directed axioms. We will show this in Section 4.2. The point is that the upward and downward
directed axioms are intuitively motivated and on top of that they give us back the T-scheme.
20Here s = t , for terms s and t , is an abbreviation of ¬(s = t). Correspondingly, the notation s =
·
t is an
abbreviation for the complex function term ¬· (s =· t), for terms s and t .
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U3 ∀x∀y(T r(x) ∧ T r(y) → (x  x ∧· y) ∧ (y  x ∧· y))
U4 ∀x∀y(T r(¬· x) ∧ T r(¬· y) → (¬· x  ¬· (x ∨· y)) ∧ (¬· y  ¬· (x ∨· y)))
U5 ∀x∀y((T r(¬· x) → ¬· x  ¬· (x ∧· y)) ∧ (T r(¬· y) → ¬· y  ¬· (x ∧· y)))
U6 ∀x∀t∀v(T r(x(t/v)) → x(t/v)  ∃· vx)
U7 ∀x∀v(∀tT r(¬· x(t/v)) → ∀t (¬· x(t/v)  ¬· ∃· vx))
U8 ∀x∀v(∀t (T r(x(t/v)) → ∀t (x(t/v)  ∀· vx))
U9 ∀x∀t∀v(T r(¬· x(t/v)) → ¬· x(t/v)  ¬· ∀· vx))
Downward Directed Axioms:
D1 ∀x(T r(¬· ¬· x) → x  ¬· ¬· x)
D2 ∀x∀y(T r(x ∨· y) → (T r(x) → x  x ∨· y) ∧ (T r(y) → y  x ∨· y))
D3 ∀x∀y(T r(x ∧· y) → (x  x ∧· y) ∧ (y  x ∧· y))
D4 ∀x∀y(T r(¬· (x ∧· y)) → (T r(¬· x) → ¬· x  ¬· (x ∨· y)) ∧ (T r(¬· y) →¬· y  ¬· (x ∨· y)))
D5 ∀x∀y(T r(¬· (x ∨· y)) → (¬· x  ¬· (x ∨· y)) ∧ (¬· y  ¬· (x ∨· y)))
D6 ∀x(T r(∃· vx(v)) → ∃t (x(t/v)  ∃· vx))
D7 ∀x∀v(T r(¬· ∃· vx) → ∀t (¬· x(t/v)  ¬· ∃· vx))
D8 ∀x∀v(T r(∀· vx → ∀t (x(t/v)  ∀· vx))
D9 ∀x∀v(T r(¬· ∀· vx) → ∃t (¬· x(t/v)  ¬· ∀· vx))
4.2 Conservativity and Truth-theoretic Commitments
We will now determine the truth-theoretic commitments and the proof-theoretic
strength of our predicational theory of ground.
As we have claimed in Section 2.2, the predicational theory of ground proves the
well-known theory of positive truth [16, p.116–22]:
Definition 3 (‘Positive Truth’) The theory PT of positive truth is formulated in LT r
and consists of the axioms of PAT and the three base truth axioms T1, T2, and T3,
plus the following axioms:
P1 ∀x(T r(x) ↔ T r(¬· ¬· x))
P2 ∀x∀y(T r(x ∧· y) ↔ T r(x) ∧ T r(y))
P3 ∀x∀y(T r(¬· (x ∧· y)) ↔ T r(¬· x ∨ T ¬· y))
P4 ∀x∀y(T r(x ∨· y) ↔ T r(x) ∨ T r(y))
P5 ∀x∀y(T r(¬· (x ∨· y)) ↔ T r(¬· x) ∧ T r(¬· y))
P6 ∀x∀v(T r(∀· vx) ↔ ∀tT r(x(t/v)))
P7 ∀x∀v(T r(¬· ∀· vx) ↔ ∃tT r(¬· x(t/v)))
P8 ∀x∀v(T r(∃· vx) ↔ ∃tT r(x(t/v)))
P9 ∀x∀v(T r(¬· ∃· vx) ↔ ∀tT r(¬· x(t/v)))
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Proposition 2 PG  PT .
Proof It suffices to derive P1−9. The derivation proceeds in every case by putting the
upward directed and the downward directed axioms of PG together while using the
axiom G3. Here we only sketch the derivation of axiom P1:
1. ∀x(T r(x) → x  ¬· ¬· x) (U1)
2. ∀x∀y(x  y → T r(x) ∧ T r(y)) (G3)
3. ∀x(T r(x) → T r(¬· ¬· x)) (1., 2., →-Elim, and ∧-Elim)
4. ∀x(T r(¬· ¬· x) → x  ¬· ¬· x) (D1)
5. ∀x(T r(¬· ¬· x) → T r(x)) (2., 4., →-Elim, and ∧-Elim)
6. ∀x(T r(x) ↔ T r(¬· ¬· x)) (3., 5., ↔-Intro)
The other axioms can be derived analogously.
This result connects the debate about axiomatic theories of truth with the debate
about partial ground. In particular, the result shows that once we move to a shared
framework for theories of truth and theories of ground, we only need to accept a
theory of partial ground to get a proper theory of truth. Admittedly, this theory has to
be formulated using the truth predicate, but this use is intuitively justified, since we
have used the truth predicate simply as a quantificational device in formalizing the
principles for partial ground.21
Proposition 2 has several interesting consequences. First, it entails as a simple
corollary that our predicational theory of ground proves all the instances of the T-
scheme:
Corollary 2 PG proves the uniform T-scheme for all sentences ϕ ∈ L:
PG ∀t1, . . . ,∀tn(T r(ϕ(t1· , . . . , tn· )) ↔ ϕ(t
◦
1 , . . . , t
◦
n))
Proof It is well-known that PT proves all the instances of the uniform T-scheme
over L. The proof of this proceeds by a simple induction on the positive complexity
of formulas. Our claim follows by Proposition 2.
21It is well-known that the theory of positive truth has the same theorems as the theory of compositional
truth: Definition: The theory CT of compositional truth has the axioms of PAT, the two basic truth axioms
T1 and T3 plus the following axioms:
C1 ∀x(T r(¬· x) ↔ ¬T r(x))
C2 ∀x∀y(T r(x ∨· y) ↔ T r(x) ∨ T r(y))
C3 ∀x∀y(T r(x ∧· y) ↔ T r(x) ∧ T r(y))
C4 ∀v∀x(T r(∃· vx) ↔ ∃tT r(x(t/v)))
C5 ∀v∀x(T r(∀· vx) ↔ ∀tT r(x(t/v)))
For a proof of the equivalence of PT and CT , see [16, p. 120]. Note that the result depends on the fact
that we start from the theory PAT in defining both PT and CT . The theories defined by the same axioms
over PA as their base theory are not equivalent (see [16, p. 120]). In the following, we will often use
well-known results about CT and apply them immediately to PT .
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Second, we can use Proposition 2 and its Corollary 2 to show interesting facts
about our predicational theory of ground, such as the fact that ground is hyperin-
tensional according to our theory. Remember that a context is hyperintensional iff
in the context the substitution of logical equivalents need not preserve truth-value
(Cresswell [8]). Now, the set of (codes of) logical truths of LT r is recursively enu-
merable, and thus weakly representable in the PA, i.e. there is a formula ϕ(x) such
that:
PA ϕ(n) iff n is the code of a logical truth.
Let’s abbreviate this formula ϕ(x) by Val(x). In particular, we’ll get for all
formulas ϕ ∈ LT r :
PA Val(ϕ) iff ϕ is a logical truth of LT r .
With this preliminaries in place, we can show the following result:
Lemma 1 PG proves that partial ground is hyperintensional in the following sense:
(i) PG ¬∀x∀y(Val(x ↔· y) → ∀z(z  x ↔ z  y))
(ii) PG ¬∀x∀y(Val(x ↔· y) → ∀z(x  z ↔ y  z))
Proof Note, for example, that PG Val(0 = 0 ↔· ¬· ¬· 0 = 0) and PG 0 =
0  ¬· ¬· 0 = 0, but PG ¬(0 = 0  0 = 0) establishing (i) and PG¬(¬· ¬· 0 = 0  ¬· ¬· 0 = 0) establishing (ii).
Note that the proof of Lemma 1 makes use of facts that we get from Proposition 2
and Corollary 2 in several places. Without using these facts, the lemma would be
difficult to prove.
Moreover, we can show a kind of adequacy result for our axiomatization with
respect to the operational theory of ground:
Proposition 3 For all sentences ϕ,ψ ∈ L, if OG ϕ ≺ ψ , then PG ϕ  ψ.
Proof By an induction on the length of derivations in OG. The only interesting step
is when the last inference in a derivation was an application of an inference rule for




This means that OG ϕ. Since ϕ ∈ L, we get by Proposition 1 that PA ϕ and
thus PG ϕ. Then by applying the T-scheme we get PG T r(ϕ) and from this,
using the axiom U1, PG ϕ¬¬ϕ. The cases for the other rules are analogous.
Note that we only need the induction hypothesis in the case of the rule:
ϕ ≺ ψ ψ ≺ θ
ϕ ≺ θ ,
which is the only rule that has formulas with the ground operator in its antecedent. We
get the result immediately by applying the induction hypothesis to the antecedents
and using the axioms G2, which captures the transitivity of partial ground.
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The other direction of Proposition 3, however, does not hold. This follows from
the fact that the theory of positive truth and thus the predicational theory of ground
is not conservative over PA. For example, positive truth proves the consistency of
PA, in the sense that PT ¬BewPA(0 = 1).22 Thus, by Proposition 2, PG
¬BewPA(0 = 1). But by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, we know that
(Incomp) PA ¬BewPA(0 = 1). Now, since PG ¬BewPA(0 = 1), we know
using the T-scheme that PG T r(¬BewPA(0 = 1)). Using the axiom U5, we
can infer from this that:
PG ¬BewPA(0 = 1)  ¬(BewPA(0 = 1) ∧ BewPA(0 = 1)).
But we cannot have that:
OG ¬BewPA(0 = 1) ≺ ¬(BewPA(0 = 1) ∧ BewPA(0 = 1)),
since then we would get the following derivation in the operational theory of ground:
...·
¬BewPA(0 = 1) ≺ ¬(BewPA(0 = 1) ∧ BewPA(0 = 1))
¬BewPA(0 = 1)




applied to the supposed derivation of ¬BewPA(0 = 1) ≺ ¬(BewPA(0 = 1) ∧
BewPA(0 = 1)). This would then mean that OG ¬BewPA(0 = 1) and thus
by Proposition 1, since ¬BewPA(0 = 1) ∈ L, that PA ¬BewPA(0 = 1)—
which is in contradiction to (Incomp). Moreover, intuitively speaking, the sentence
¬BewPA(0 = 1) is true—we know, for example by Gentzen’s consistency proof,
that PA is indeed consistent. But then the formal application of U5 to¬BewPA(0 =
1) is intuitively justified: the truth of ¬(BewPA(0 = 1) ∧ BewPA(0 = 1))
holds indeed in virtue of the truth of¬BewPA(0 = 1). So, our predicational theory
of ground proves an intuitively true claim about partial ground that the operational
theory does not.
Thus, we know that the predicational theory of ground is stronger than the
operational theory of ground. But how strong is it exactly? Here is the answer:
Theorem 1 PG is a proof-theoretically conservative extension of PT .
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Let c· represent the com-
plexity function and <· represent the strictly-less-than relation on the natural numbers
again. We define the translation function τ : LT r → LT r recursively by saying that:
(i) τ(ϕ) =
{
ϕ, if ϕ ∈ LT r atomic,
T r(s) ∧ T r(t) ∧ c· (s) <· c· (t), if ϕ = s  t;
22The unary predicate BewPA strongly represents the set of codes of sentences provable in PA. Here we
simply take it to be an abbreviation of the (long) defining formula for Bew.
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(ii) τ(¬ϕ) = ¬τ(ϕ);
(iii) τ(ϕ ◦ ψ) = τ(ϕ) ◦ τ(ψ), for ◦ = ∧,∨; and
(iv) τ(Qxϕ) = Qx(τ(ϕ)), for Q = ∀, ∃.23
It is again easy to see that (a) τ(ϕ) = ϕ, if ϕ ∈ LT r . Next we check that (b)
the translation preserves theoremhood from PG to PT , in the sense that for all
ϕ ∈ LT r , if PG ϕ, then PT τ(ϕ). We prove this result by an induction on the
length of derivations. All the arithmetic axioms and rules of PG and PT are the
same and all the instances of the induction scheme over LT r become instances of the
induction scheme over LT r under τ . Thus, it suffices to show that the images of the
ground-theoretic axioms are derivable in PT . Here we just show the claim for two
cases:
– In the case of the axiom G1, we get τ(∀x¬(x  x)) = ∀x¬(T r(x) ∧ T r(x) ∧
c· (x) <· c· (x)). We know that PA ∀x(Sent (x) → ¬(c· (x) <· c· (x))). SincePT ∀x(T r(x) → Sent (x)), the claim follows by simple logic.
– In the case of the axiom U1, we get that τ(∀x(T r(x) → x  ¬· ¬· x)) =∀x(T r(x) → T r(x)∧T r(¬· ¬· x)∧ c· (x) <· c· (¬· ¬· x)). Now, let x be a fresh vari-
able and assume that T r(x) for a →-Intro in PT followed by a generalization.
We need to derive T r(x) ∧ T r(¬· ¬· x) ∧ c· (x) <· c· (¬· ¬· x). The first conjunct of
the consequent is simply the assumption T r(x). By the axiom P1, ∀x(T r(x) ↔
T r(¬· ¬· x)), we can derive T r(¬· ¬· x) from the first conjunct and thus we get the
second conjunct. Finally, for the last conjunct of the consequent is derivable,
note that PT ∀x(T r(x) → Sent (x)) and thus PT T r(x) → Sent (x), as well
as PT ∀x(Sent (x) → (c· (x) <· c· (¬· ¬· x)). Thus, we get the third conjunct
c· (x) <· c· (¬· ¬· x) by simple logic. The claim follows.
The other axioms can be derived in a similar way under τ . The theorem follows
by putting (a) and (b) together.
The theorem has two important immediate consequences:
Corollary 3 The theory PG is proof-theoretically consistent.
Corollary 4 The theory PG has the same arithmetic theorems as the theory ACA
of arithmetical comprehension.24
23Note that the translation of s  t is in the same spirit as the translation of ϕ ≺ ψ in the proof of
Proposition 1: while there we had τ(ϕ ≺ ψ) = ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ c· (ϕ) <· c· (ψ), we now have τ(s  t) =
T r(s) ∧ T r(t) ∧ c· (s) <· c· (t). In the case of ϕ ≺ ψ we didn’t need to translate ϕ and ψ , since they were
already assumed to be in L. Similarly, here we know that if PG s  t , then by G3 and T3 we get that
PG T (s) ∧ T (t) and PG Sent (s) ∧ Sent (t). In words, if s  t is provable in PG, then it’s provable in
PG that s and t are names of true sentences of L. It is effectively this limitation of PG to partial ground
between truths of the language of arithmetic that enables us to prove the conservativity result.
24For a definition of ACA, see [16, p. 107–8].
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Proof This follows from the facts that PG is a conservative extension of PT and
that PT has the same arithmetical theorems as ACA.25
Thus, Propositions 2 and Theorem 1 allow us to determine the proof-theoretic
strength of our predicational theory of ground. Moreover, philosophically speaking,
together the theorems shows that our predicational theory of ground and the theory
of positive truth say the same things about truth. Since PG is a conservative exten-
sion of PT , the two theories prove exactly the same theorems in the language LT r .
Moreover, looking at the axioms of both theories, we can see that they paint the same
truth-theoretic picture, as it were. Looking at the axioms of both theories, we see
that they only contain positive occurrences of the truth predicate, where T r occurs
exclusively in the scope of an even number (in fact, zero) negations. In other words,
according to both theories, the truths are built up successively from other, less com-
plex truths—and never from falsehoods.26 What the predicational theory of ground
adds to this picture is that it stratifies the truths into a hierarchy according to their
complexity: the result is the hierarchy of grounds. In this specific sense, the predica-
tional framework allows us to make the truth-theoretic commitments of the theory of
partial ground explicit.
4.3 Models for Partial Ground
In the last section, we have proved the consistency of the predicational theory of
ground from the fact that it is a conservative extension of the consistent theory of
positive truth. By the completeness theorem for first-order logic, we can infer from
this that there is a first-order model of the predicational theory. But the way we
proved this result does not give us any idea of what such a model looks like. In this
subsection, we will construct a model for our theory “from scratch.”
Consider the set S that contains all and only the codes of formulas that are true in
the standard model of arithmetic:
S =def {#ϕ | ϕ ∈ L,N  ϕ}.
Then (N,S) is a model of the theory of positive truth—the standard model of PT .27
To construct our model, we will use grounding-trees over the standard model of
PT . Grounding-trees were first introduced by Correia [6].28 Here we give a slightly
different definition of grounding-trees, which is adapted to the present purpose:
25We can prove this result via the equivalence of PT and CT (see Fn 21 and the usual proof that CT has
the same arithmetic theorems as ACA. For the details of this proof, see [16, p. 101–16 respectively]).
26For this point it matters that we are talking about PT and not the equivalent theoryCT . SinceCT has the
axiom ∀x(T r(¬· x) ↔ ¬T r(x)), where T r occurs negatively in the scope of a single negation, the theory
paints a different truth-theoretic picture. According to CT , the truths are build up from less complex truths
and falsehoods. The point here is that the truth-theoretic picture painted by a theory is highly sensitive to
the concrete axiomatization of the theory: even though CT and PT are equivalent, they paint a different
picture.
27For a proof, see [16, p. 116–22].
28In forthcoming work, Litland [19] and deRosset [9] argue for the ground-theoretic relevance of trees.
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Definition 4 Let (N,S) be the standard model of PT . We define the grounding-trees
over (N,S) recursively by saying that for all formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ L:
(i) if #ϕ ∈ S, then #ϕ is a grounding-tree over (N,S) with #ϕ as its root;
(ii) if is a grounding-tree T over (N,S) with #ϕ as its root, then is a
grounding-tree over (N,S) with #¬¬ϕ as its root;
(iii) if is a grounding-tree T over (N,S) with #ϕ as its root, then is
a grounding-tree over (N,S) with #(ϕ ∨ ψ) as its root;
(iv) if is a grounding-tree T over (N,S) with #ψ as its root, then
is a grounding-tree over (N,S) with #(ϕ ∨ ψ) as its root;
(v) if are grounding-trees T1, T2 over (N,S)with #ϕ, #ψ as their roots
respectively, then is a grounding-tree over (N,S) with #(ϕ ∧ ψ)
as its root;
(vi) if is a grounding-tree T over (N,S) with #ϕ(t) as its root, then
is a grounding-tree over (N,S) with #∃xϕ(x) as its root;
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(vii) if , . . . are grounding-trees T1, T2, . . . over (N,S) with
#ϕ(t1), #ϕ(t2), . . . as their roots respectively, where t1, t2, . . . are all and only
the terms of LPA, then is a grounding-tree over (N,S)
with #∀xϕ(x) as its root;
(viii) if is a grounding-tree T over (N,S) with #¬ϕ as its root, then
is a grounding-tree over (N,S) with #¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) as its root;
(ix) if is a grounding-tree T over (N,S) with #¬ψ as its root, then
is a grounding-tree over (N,S) with #¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) as its root;
(x) if are grounding-trees T1, T2 over (N,S) with #¬ϕ, #¬ψ as their
roots respectively, then is a grounding-tree over (N,S) with
#¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) as its root;
(xi) if is a grounding-tree T over (N,S) with #¬ϕ(t) as its root, then
is a grounding-tree over (N,S) with #¬∀xϕ(x) as its root;
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(xii) if , . . . are grounding-trees T1, T2, . . . over (N,S) with
#¬ϕ(t1), #¬ϕ(t2), . . . as their roots respectively, where t1, t2, . . . are all and
only the terms of LPA, then is a grounding-tree over
(N,S) with #∀xϕ(x) as its root;
(xiii) nothing else is a grounding-tree over (N,S).
Mathematically speaking, the grounding-trees over (N,S) are rooted graphs,
where the vertices are codes of formulas, one vertex is distinguished as the root,
and the edges are constructed according to the above definition. Note that by clauses
(vii) and (xii), there are infinitely wide grounding-trees over (N,S). Nevertheless,
all grounding-trees over (N,S) have a finite height, where this concept is defined
recursively on the construction of the grounding-trees over (N,S):
Definition 5 We define the height h(T ) of a grounding-tree T over (N,S) by saying
that:
(i) all grounding-trees over (N,S) of the form #ϕ ∈ S have height one;
(ii) if T is a grounding-tree over (N,S) that is constructed from grounding-
trees T1, T2, . . . over (N,S) according to clauses (ii–xii) of Definition 4,
then the height of T is one plus the least upper bound of the heights of
T1, T2, . . .:
h(T ) = lub{h(T1), h(T2), . . .} + 1,
where lub is the operation of taking least upper bounds.
We call a grounding-tree over (N,S) degenerate iff it is of height one.
The argument that grounding-trees have finite height now is a simple induction
on the construction of the grounding-trees, where we note that in clauses (vii) and
(xii) the height of the grounding-trees T1, T2, . . . is bounded by the (finite) logical
complexity of ϕ. Thus, we can use induction on the height of the grounding-trees as
a proof-method for claims about grounding-trees: if all degenerate grounding-trees
have a property and we can show for all grounding-trees T that if all grounding-trees
of lower height have the property, then T has the property, then all grounding-trees
have the property.
For example, we can use this method to establish that the grounding-trees over
(N,S) are really trees on the truths in (N,S):
Lemma 2 Let (N,S) be the standard model of PT and let T be a grounding-tree
over (N,S). Then for all formulas ϕ ∈ L, if #ϕ is a vertex in T , then #ϕ ∈ S.
J. Korbmacher
Proof The claim trivially holds for all degenerate grounding-trees over (N,S) by
clause (i) of Definition 4. So assume the induction hypothesis. For the induction step,
we go through all the ways in which T could have been constructed according to
Definition 4 and check that the claim holds. Here we only show this for clause (ii).
Assume that T is of the form , where is a grounding-tree T ′ over (N,S)
with #ϕ as its root. Then, since T ′ is a grounding-tree over (N,S) with strictly lower
height than T , we know by the induction hypothesis that #ϕ ∈ S and thus N  ϕ. But
then, by classical logic, also N  ¬¬ϕ and thus #¬¬ϕ ∈ S. The claim follows. The
cases for the other clauses are analogous.
Next, we wish to show that the grounding-trees over (N,S) don’t contain any
cycles or “loops.” This follows from the following useful lemma. Let us define
the notion of an occurrence of the code #ϕ of a formula ϕ ∈ L to be below
an occurrence of the code #ψ of formula ψ ∈ L in a grounding-tree T over
(N,S) recursively by saying that: no occurrence of any formula in a degenerate
grounding-tree over (N,S) is below an occurrence of any formula in the tree, and
if T is a grounding-tree over (N,S) that was constructed from grounding-trees
T1, T2, . . . over (N,S) according to the rules (ii–xii) of Definition 4, then all occur-
rences of all formulas in T1, T2, . . . occur below the root of T in T . Then we can
show:
Lemma 3 Let (N,S) be the standard model of PT . If T is a grounding-tree over
(N,S) with #ϕ as its root, for some formula ϕ, then, all formulas ψ whose code #ψ
occurs below #ϕ in T have a lower complexity than ϕ.
Proof The claim trivially holds for degenerate grounding-trees, since no code occurs
below any code in degenerate grounding-trees. So assume the induction hypothesis.
For the induction step, we note that in all the ways in which a grounding-tree can be
constructed from other grounding-trees, the formula whose code is at the root of the
new grounding-tree is the only new formula and always has higher complexity than
the roots of the grounding-trees that it is constructed from. The claim follows than by
a simple application of the induction hypothesis.
Using this lemma, we obtain:
Lemma 4 Let (N,S) be the standard model of PT and T is a grounding-tree over
(N,S). Then between any two nodes #ϕ and #ψ in T , for formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ L, there
is exactly one path, i.e. there are no cycles.
Proof Degenerate grounding-trees clearly contain no cycles. So assume the induction
hypothesis. For the induction step, consider some arbitrary grounding-tree T with
root #ϕ, for some formula ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, we know that all the trees
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that T is constructed from don’t contain any loops. Now assume that in the last step
of the construction of T a loop is introduced. This would mean that #ϕ has to occur
somewhere in the grounding-trees that T was constructed from. This would mean
that #ϕ occurs below #ϕ in T . But then by Lemma 3, we would get that |ϕ| < |ϕ|,
which is impossible. The claim follows.
Remember that a rooted tree in the mathematical sense is a rooted graph that does
not contain any cycles. Thus, the grounding-trees over (N,S) are simply rooted trees
over S. In a rooted tree, all edges have a natural direction, either towards or away
from the root. Given Lemma 3, we can say that all the edges in a grounding-tree T
over (N,S) naturally point toward its root. Finally, we wish to show that the set of
grounding-trees over (N,S) is transitive in the following sense:
Lemma 5 Let (N,S) be the standard model of PT . If there is a grounding-tree
T1 over (N,S) with #ψ as its root and #ϕ1, #ϕ2, . . . as its leaves and there is a
grounding-tree T2 over (N,S) with #ψ, #ψ1, #ψ2, . . . as its leaves and #θ as its root,
then there is a grounding-tree T3 over (N,S) with #ϕ1, #ϕ2, . . . , #ψ1, #ψ2, . . . as its
leaves and #θ as its root.
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on the height of T2. If T2 is a degenerate
grounding-tree over (N,S), then T1 is already the grounding-tree we are looking
for. So, assume the induction hypothesis and let T1 and T2 be grounding-trees as
described in the statement of the proposition. Now, we go through the different ways
that T2 could have been constructed from other grounding-trees. Assume, for exam-
ple, that T2 is constructed using clause (ii) of Definition 4. Then T2 is of the form:
and its root is #θ = #¬¬θ ′. Since is then a grounding-tree with a strictly
lower height than T2, by the induction hypothesis we get a grounding-tree T ′3 with
root #θ ′ and #ϕ1, #ϕ2, . . ., #ψ1, #ψ2, . . . as its leaves. Then by a simple application
of (ii) of Definition 4, we get the existence of the desired grounding-tree T3 with root
#θ = #¬¬θ ′ and leaves #ϕ1, #ϕ2, . . . , #ψ1, #ψ2, . . .. The cases for the other clauses
are analogous.
The proof essentially shows that matching grounding-trees can be “glued
together,” as it were.
Putting all of the above together, we can say that the non-degenerate grounding-
trees over (N,S) intuitively correspond to grounding-facts in (N,S): the codes at the
leaves correspond to the truths that ground and the code at the root corresponds to the
truth being grounded. More formally, Lemmas 4 and 5 together allow us to define a
strict partial order on the elements of S (i.e. the truths according to (N,S)): we say
that a number n ∈ S is “strictly below” a number m ∈ S iff there is a non-degenerate
grounding-tree connecting the two:
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Definition 6 Let (N,S) be the standard model of PT . We define the relationR ⊆ N2
by saying that for all n,m ∈ N, R(m, n) iff there is a non-degenerate grounding-tree
over (N,S) with n as a leaf and m as its root.
To be perfectly explicit, let’s look at how R interprets the predicate in the model
(N,S,R). Consider an atomic formula of the form st and a valuation σ in (N,S,R).
Using standard first-order semantics, we get: (N,S,R) σ s  t iff R(sσ , tσ ),
where tσ is the value of the term t under the assignment σ .29 In words, a formula
s  t is true in (N,S,R) under an assignment σ just in case there is a non-degenerate
grounding-tree over (N,S) with the value of t under σ as its root and the value of s
under σ as one of its leaves.
The relation R of Definition 6, then, indeed interprets the ground predicate
correctly (in the way just described):
Theorem 2 (N,S,R)  PG.
Proof We need to show that all the axioms of PG are satisfied in (N,S,R). Since
the basic truth axioms T1, T2, and T3 are also axioms of PT , we know already that
(N,S,R)  T1,2,3 as (N,S) is the standard model of PT . For the basic ground
axioms G1, G2, and G3 we get the following arguments:
– (N,S,R)  ∀x¬(x  x)
This follows from Lemma 4: Assume that (N,S,R)  ∃x(x  x). Thus for
some variable assignment σ over (N,S,R) and some x-variant σ ′ of σ ,30 we
have (N,S,R) σ ′ x  x meaning R(σ ′(x), σ ′(x)). By Definition 6 this means
that there is a non-degenerate grounding tree over (N,S) with σ ′(x) as its root
and σ ′(x) as a leaf. But this tree would contain a loop, i.e. a path from σ ′(x) to
σ ′(x), in contradiction to Lemma 4. Thus (N,S,R)  ∃x(x  x) and thus by
classical logic (N,S,R)  ∀x¬(x  x).
– (N,S,R)  ∀x∀y∀z(x  y ∧ y  z → x  z)
This follows from Lemma 5: Let σ be a variable assignment over (N,S,R)
and σ ′ an x, y, z-variant σ such that (N,S,R) σ ′ xy and (N,S,R) σ ′ yz.
This means thatR(σ ′(x), σ ′(y)) andR(σ ′(y), σ ′(z)). By Definition 6 this means
that are non-degenerate grounding-trees T1 and T2 over (N,S) such that T1 has
σ ′(x) as a leaf and σ ′(y) as its root and T2 has σ ′(y) as a leaf and σ ′(z) as its
root. By Lemma 5, there is a grounding-tree T3 over (N,S) with σ ′(x) as a leaf
and σ ′(z) as its root. Thus, R(σ ′(x), σ ′(z)) and thus σ ′ x  z. Since σ was
arbitrary, we get that (N,S,R)  ∀x∀y∀z(x  y ∧ y  z → x  z).
– (N,S,R)  ∀x∀y(x  y → T r(x) ∧ T r(y))
This follows from Lemma 2: Let σ be a variable assignment over (N,S,R)
and σ ′ an x, y-variant of σ such that (N,S,R) σ ′ x  y. This means
29The value of a term under an assignment is defined in the usual recursive way. In the following, we only
need that the value xσ of a variable x under an assignment σ simply is σ(x).
30Remember that a variable assignment σ ′ is an x variant of another variable assignment σ iff σ ′(x) =
σ(x).
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that R(σ ′(x), σ ′(y)) and thus by Definition 6 that there is a non-degenerate
grounding-tree over (N,S)with σ ′(x) as a leaf and σ ′(y) as its root. By Lemma 2
if follows that σ ′(x), σ ′(y) ∈ S. Since S interprets T r , we get that (N,S,R) σ ′
T r(x) ∧ T r(y). Since σ was arbitrary, we get (N,S,R)  ∀x∀y(x  y →
T r(x) ∧ T r(y)).
For the upward and downward directed axioms, we only consider the cases U1 and
D1, as the other cases are analogous:
– (N,S,R)  ∀x(T r(x) → x  ¬· ¬· x)
Let σ be a variable assignment over (N,S,R) and σ ′ some x-variant of σ .
Assume that (N,S,R) σ ′ T r(x). This means that σ ′(x) ∈ S. Since S =
{#ϕ | ϕ ∈ L,N  ϕ}, we know that σ ′(x) = #ϕ, for some formula ϕ ∈ L. Now,
by clause (i) of Definition 4, #ϕ is a degenerate grounding-tree over (N,S). But
then, by clause (ii) of Definition 4, is a non-degenerate grounding-tree
over (N,S). Moreover, the root of this tree is #¬¬ϕ and its only leaf is #ϕ. Now
consider σ ′(¬· ¬· x). Since we know that σ
′(x) = #ϕ and ¬· expresses the nega-
tion function on the codes of formulas, we know that σ ′(¬· ¬· x) = #¬¬ϕ. Thus,
R(σ ′(x), σ ′(¬· ¬· x)) meaning σ ′ x  ¬· ¬· x. And since σ was arbitrary, we get
(N,S,R)  ∀x(T r(x) → x  ¬· ¬· x).
– (N,S,R)  ∀x(T r(¬· ¬· x) → x  ¬· ¬· x)
Let σ be a variable assignment over (N,S,R) and σ ′ some x-variant of σ .
Assume that (N,S,R) σ ′ T r(¬· ¬· x). This means that σ
′(¬· ¬· x) ∈ S. Again,
since S = {#ϕ | ϕ ∈ L,N  ϕ} and since ¬· represents the negation function
on the codes of formulas, we know that σ ′(¬· ¬· x) = #¬¬ϕ, for some formula
ϕ ∈ L such that N  ¬¬ϕ. From the latter it follows by classical logic that
N  ϕ. Moreover, we know that σ ′(x) = #ϕ and thus that #σ ′(x) ∈ S. But
then we get that (N,S,R) σ ′ T r(x) and by the argument for the axiom U1 that
σ ′ x  ¬· ¬· x. Hence, we get (N,S,R)  ∀x(T r(¬· ¬· x) → x  ¬· ¬· x), since σ
was arbitrary.
4.4 Grounding-Trees and Conceptualist Ground
We have shown how to extend the standard model of the theory of positive truth
to a standard model of our predicational theory of ground. Note, however, that our
construction will not necessarily work if we start from non-standard models of the
theory of positive truth. At many points in our construction, we have made use of
the fact that we’re working in the standard model of the theory of positive truth.
Most importantly, in our construction we have relied on the fact that the exten-
sion of the truth predicate coincides with the codes of formulas that are true in
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the standard model of PA. But in a non-standard model of the theory of positive
truth this need not be the case. There we might have non-standard elements in the
extension of the truth predicate, such as objects that according to the model are
sentences with infinite complexity.31 As a result, in such non-standard models, our
construction will break down. Perhaps there is another construction that will allow
us to extend non-standard models of the theory of positive truth to (non-standard)
models of our predicational theory of ground. But here we leave this question
open, as the point of the construction was to show what the standard model looks
like.
By looking at the standard model of our predicational theory of truth, we can
draw some lessons for the conceptualist semantics of ground. The model we have
constructed is a model for a conceptualist notion of partial ground—it provides a
semantics for our conceptualist ground predicate. Moreover, since we work in a stan-
dard first-order setting, we have a general notion of a model for predicational theories
of ground. Developing a general conceptualist semantics for ground operators, in
contrast, is still very much an open problem. But we can use the model that we have
constructed to approach this problem. To begin with, we can interpret the operational
theory of ground OG (Definition 1) over the model (N,S,R). We simply say for all
formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ L:
(N,S,R)  ϕ ≺ ψ iffdef (N,S,R)  ϕ  ψ.
It then follows from Proposition 3 that this interpretation is sound with respect to
OG, in the sense that for all ϕ,ψ ∈ L, if OG ϕ ≺ ψ , then (N, S,R)  ϕ ≺ ψ .32
For assume that OG ϕ ≺ ψ . By Proposition 3, it follows that PG ϕ  ψ.
Then, by Theorem 2, we get that (N,S,R)  ϕ  ψ and thus by the above
definition that (N,S,R)  ϕ ≺ ψ . But this interpretation does not yet tell us what
models for the language L≺, in which the theory OG is formulated, should look like
in general. But it gives us a hint about what kind of structure we can use to interpret




{T | T is a non-degenerate grounding-tree over (N,S)},
where unionmulti denotes the operation of taking disjoint unions. Then, mathematically speak-
ing, T is a forest. As we have said before, the (non-degenerate) grounding-trees over
(N,S) intuitively correspond to individual grounding facts. The forest T, then, corre-
sponds intuitively to the whole hierarchy of grounds. Moreover, we can equivalently
rephrase our definition of R that interprets our ground predicate  (Definition 6) by
saying that for all m, n ∈ N:
R(m, n) iff there is a T ∈ T with m as its leaf and n as its root.
31For more on non-standard models of theories of syntax and truth, see [16, p. 83–89].
32Of course, the interpretation is not complete, in the sense that there are sentences ϕ,ψ ∈ L such that
 ϕ ≺ ψ and OG ϕ ≺ ψ . This follows from the argument given above in Section 4.2 for the failure of
the converse direction of Proposition 3.
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With this definition in place, we can interpret OG over the structure (N,T). We
simply equivalently restate the definition of (N,T)  ϕ ≺ ψ by saying that for all
ϕ,ψ ∈ L :
(N,T)  ϕ ≺ ψ iff there is a T ∈ T with #ϕ as its leaf and #ψ as its root.
Now, take a look at the structure (N,T). On the above interpretation, the compo-
nent N interprets the arithmetic vocabulary and in particular the names for sentences.
The forest T, on the other hand, interprets the ground operator ≺. By abstracting
from this, we arrive at a notion of an arbitrary model for L≺: The idea is that a
model for L≺ is a pair (T , F (T )), where T is a suitable set of fine-grained truths and
F(T ) is a suitable forest over the elements of T . Of course, developing this idea in
detail still requires a lot of work. But we wish to suggest that an intuitively plausi-
ble, graph-theoretic semantics for the ground operator can be obtained in this way.
Incidentally, in forthcoming work, Litland [19] and deRosset [9] have already shown
promising results in this direction—the results of this section give further support to
this approach.
5 Conclusion
In this part of the paper, we’ve developed the predicational theory of partial ground
PG. We’ve shown that the theory is a conservative extension of the theory of posi-
tive truth PT and thus consistent, and we’ve constructed a concrete model for PG
in terms of grounding-trees. In Section 2, we’ve already pointed at some useful
applications of the theory. In the second part of this paper will look more closely
at applications to do with truth and partial ground. Let’s close with an important
observation about one important generalization of our results.
Note that, at least in its present state, the approach of this paper only works for the
relation of partial ground: as soon as we approach full ground using our ground pred-
icate, we face problems. Full ground, remember, is the relation of one truth holding
wholly in virtue of a possible plurality of others. Philosophically speaking, it is nat-
ural to suppose that the relation of full ground is more fundamental than the relation
of partial ground. As Fine [13, p. 50] argues, we can define partial ground in terms
of full ground: We simply say that one truth partially grounds another iff the former
truth possibly together with some others fully grounds the latter truth. But conversely,
Fine argues, it is not possible to define full ground in terms of partial ground. His
argument runs as follows: Let ϕ and ψ be two true sentences. Then, intuitively, the
truth of ϕ ∨ ψ holds both fully in virtue of the truth of ϕ and fully in virtue of the
truth of ψ . Thus, both the truth of ϕ and the truth of ψ are full grounds of the truth
of ϕ ∨ ψ . Consequently, the two truths are also partial grounds of the truth of ϕ ∨ ψ .
Now consider the truth of ϕ∧ψ . Intuitively, the truth of ϕ∧ψ holds partially in virtue
of the truths of ϕ and ψ , but not wholly in virtue of either truth. Thus, the truths of ϕ
and ψ are partial grounds, but not full grounds of the truth of ϕ ∧ψ . We have the fol-
lowing scenario: the truths of ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ∧ ψ have the exact same partial grounds,
but different full grounds. Thus, it is unclear how we should define the full grounds
of a truth solely based on its partial grounds.
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If we take full ground to be more fundamental than partial ground, it is natural to
think that we should develop an axiomatic theory of full ground that proves our theory
of partial ground as a sub-theory. Full ground is what Correia [5, p. 255] calls amany-
to-one relation: it is the relation of one truth holding in virtue of a possible plurality
of others. Now, how should we reflect this fact syntactically? A first approach would
be to stick to a binary ground predicate and represent the possible pluralities of truths
as sets of sentences. But this approach only carries so far. Using the technique of
Go¨del numbering, we can only represent finite sets of sentence, but not arbitrary sets
of sentences.33 But in many cases, the plurality of full grounds is intuitively infinite.
Think for example of the truth of ∀x(S(x) = 0). Intuitively, the truth holds wholly
in virtue of all the truths of S(0) = 0, S(1) = 0, . . . taken together. For this reason,
it seems that we need to adopt multigrade predicates in the style of [23], which take
arbitrary sequents of terms as arguments. If we let  be such a multigrade predicate
for the relation of strict full ground, we can formalize the first example as:
S(0) = 0, S(1) = 0, . . .  ∀x(S(x) = 0),
while we can at the same time write:
S(0) = 0  S(0) = 0 ∨ 0 = 0
to say that the truth of S(0) = 0 fully grounds the truth of S(0) = 0 ∨ 0 = 0.
Multigrade predicates, however, mean a significant deviation from standard logic to
infinitary logic. It would be a non-trivial fact that the results of this paper still apply
in this context and working out the details is beyond the scope of the present paper.34
We leave this for future research.
Acknowledgments I’d like to thank Hannes Leitgeb, Benjamin Schnieder, Albert Anglberger, Thomas
Schindler, Lavinia Picollo, Johannes Stern, Martin Fischer, Tim Button, the participants of the workshop
“Logical and Metaphysical Perspectives on Grounding” at the GAP.9 in Osnabru¨ck, O. Foisch, and an
anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. Part of this research was supported by the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s)
and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
33This follows immediately from Cantor’s theorem, which entails that the set ℘(L) of all sets of sentences
of L has a strictly bigger cardinality than L itself. Note that the language L of PA is countable, i.e. it has
the same cardinality of as the natural numbers. Now assume that there is a coding function that injectively
maps every set of sentence  ⊆ L to a unique code # ∈ N. This would mean that the cardinality of ℘(L)
is less than or equal to the cardinality of N. But this would mean that the cardinality of ℘(L) is less than
or equal to the cardinality of L, which is impossible. Thus there is no such coding function.
34Another infinitary issue that pops up in the context of full ground is that Fine [13] argues that we need an
infinitary totality (multigrade-)predicate T that applies to a sequence of terms t1, t2, . . . iff the denotations
of t1, t2, . . . make up the domain of discourse. This predicate, so Fine, is needed to properly account
for the full grounds of the truths of quantified statements. Once we’ve moved to a multigrade setting,
accommodating such a predicate will be relatively straight-forward, but the step to multigrade predicates
is, as we’ve just pointed out, non-trivial.
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